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 I. Introduction 
 
 There is little doubt that the ever-improving processes of telecommunications and 
data processing, interacting with liberalized governmental policies, are bringing about rising 
levels of international trade and international capital flows.  Further, through the 1980s and 
1990s the global economy experienced major waves of corporate mergers.1 
 In this context, then, questions about the levels of and trends in aggregate 
concentration in the global economy -- the share of worldwide economic activity that is 
accounted for by the largest X companies -- are interesting ones to ask.  This paper 
addresses those questions, conceptually and empirically.  After addressing a number of 
methodological and data issues, I present new and original evidence concerning global 
aggregate concentration.  To my knowledge, this evidence constitutes the first systematic 
effort to measure global aggregate concentration. 
 In summary, suitable data are available only for the years 1994-2001 and require 
some compromises and approximations.  For 2001, the largest 500 global companies' 
employment accounted for 1.60% of the world labor force, or 9.92% of OECD 
employment.  These companies' profits amounted to 0.94% of world GDP or 4.16% of 
world gross domestic savings (GDS); their profits also amounted to 1.18% of OECD GDP 
or 5.62% of OECD gross national saving (GNS).  Similar estimates are available for the 
largest 50 global companies. 
                                                           
    1 Documentation and discussion of those merger waves can be found in Golbe and White 
(1988, 1993), Black (2000), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), White (2001), and Pryor 
(2001a). 
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 The time trends for 1994-2001 show a mixed picture.  If employment is the basis for 
the measurements, the largest 50 global companies accounted for a slightly decreasing 
share of aggregate employment over time.  If, instead, profits are the basis for the 
measurements, then the 50 largest companies accounted for an increasing share over these 
same years.  But this latter trend is likely overstated and is unlikely to be sustained. 
 This paper will proceed as follows: I address in Section II the issue of why the 
measurement of global aggregate concentration is interesting in its own right.  The 
conceptual/measurement issues are discussed in Section III.  The evidence from past 
national studies are summarized in Section IV.  Section V discusses the specific data 
sources and measurements, as well as their limitations, for the global concentration 
calculations.  Section VI presents the new data on global concentration levels and trends.  
Section VII offers a brief conclusion. 
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 II. What Is Global Aggregate Concentration, and Why Is It Interesting? 
 
A. What is global aggregate concentration? 
 The measurement of aggregate global concentration would measure the share of 
worldwide economic activity (or some proxy for it) that is accounted for by the X largest 
companies in the global economy.  A "one shot" measurement would yield some 
information, although there are few standards for comparison and judgment.  More 
information would come from multiple measurements over a period of time, so that trends 
might be observed. 
 
B. Why is it interesting? 
 At the beginning, it is important to emphasize what such a measure of global 
aggregate concentration would not be:  It would not be an antitrust indicator and would not 
provide guidance as to monopoly (market) power in individual markets.  To see why, let us 
suppose (as a hypothetical example) that the largest 100 companies in the global economy 
accounted for 100% of all economic activity, which would surely be considered to be an 
extreme (and wildly unrealistic) extent of global concentration.  Yet, if each of those 100 
companies participated in all relevant markets, the level of seller concentration in each of 
those markets would be indicative of near-perfect competition.2 
 Why then would the measurement of global concentration be of interest?  The 
primary interest in such measurements surely arises from socio-political concerns.  To 
illustrate those concerns, let us take as an example the United States economy.  As of 2000, 
there were 5.5 million corporations, 2.0 million partnerships, 17.7 million non-farm sole 
                                                           
    2 The only antitrust concern that might be raised would be that of multi-market contacts 
among the 100 companies.  For discussions of the potential and actual influence of multi-
market contacts, see Feinberg (1985), Rhoades and Heggestad (1985), Bernheim and 
Whinston (1990), and Evans and Kessides (1994). 
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proprietorships, and 1.8 million farm sole proprietorships.3  The overwhelming majority of 
these enterprises were quite small, consisting of only a few employees each.  At the other 
end of the spectrum, the 100 largest companies, as measured by the Census Bureau, 
accounted for 11.4% of private-sector employment and 11.5% of private-sector payroll in 
that same year. 
 Now let us imagine, instead, that the largest 100 companies in the U.S. accounted 
for all of private sector employment and payroll.  The nature of civil society would surely 
be different in this latter case.  The average number of employees per enterprise would be 
over one million, and the average value added per company would be about $80 billion.  
There would be no small enterprises, no start-ups, no alternative places (beyond the 100) 
where someone with a new entrepreneurial idea might go to obtain financial support and 
institutional encouragement.  Political power relationships would surely be different as well. 
 Even if there were 1,000 economy-wide companies (rather than 100), and the per-company 
magnitudes were only one-tenth as large, the fabric of the economic (and socio-political) 
landscape would surely be very different from what it actually is. 
 Of course, there may well be pluses as well as minuses for an economy where very 
large companies are the dominant or sole private-sector employers.  Large companies do 
tend to provide a greater level of employment security and stability than do smaller 
companies, which may compensate for the greater bureaucracy and reduced flexibility that 
accompanies greater size.  Nevertheless, the important point is that this hypothetical 100-
company economy would be a very different one from the actual U.S. economy; and it 
seems likely that a large fraction of the inhabitants of the U.S. would consider such a 
structure to be inferior to what is currently present.  Similar considerations would hold for 
describing a high level of concentration in the global economy. 
 Finally, even if an observer is agnostic as to whether the global level of aggregate 
                                                           
    3 These data, and those that follow, are drawn from White (2001, 2002). 
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concentration is something that warrants attention and concern (after all, beyond the 
extreme hypothetical example described above, what constitutes a "high" or "low" 
number?), measurement of trends -- changes over time -- nevertheless are likely to be of 
interest:  If aggregate concentration is not changing or is decreasing, then anything that 
might be considered to be a "problem" is not getting worse and may be getting better. 
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III. Measurement Issues 
 
 Since aggregate global concentration is calculated as the share of some measure or 
measures of global economic activity that is accounted for by the largest X companies, there 
are three fundamental measurement issues that must be addressed: (1) What measure or 
measures of economic activity should be used? (2) What entities should be included in the 
numerator of the calculation? and (3) Who and what should be included in the 
denominator?  We will address each issue in turn. 
 
A. What measure or measures of economic activity? 
 If the relative importance of large companies' economic activity is the concept of 
interest, then value added -- the difference between the value of an enterprise's sales and the 
value of its purchased inputs (other than labor and capital)4 -- is surely the best all-around 
measure.  As its name implies, it does indicate the value added of an enterprise.  Further, it 
has the advantage of being comparable across enterprises. 
 Some other candidate measures -- employment, aggregate wages or payroll, or 
profits -- are simply components (directly or indirectly) of value added.  For example, 
employment can be viewed as an indirect component of value-added, since it is employment 
multiplied by the compensation per worker that yields aggregate labor income, which is a 
direct component of value added. 
 Although profits in theory are a direct component of value-added, it should be noted 
that accounting profits can be a shaky measure to use in comparing economic activity across 
firms or time periods.5  After all, a company's reported pre-tax profits can be affected by the 
                                                           
    4 Equivalently, value added is the sum of wages and salaries and other labor costs, plus 
profits and other capital costs such as amortization and depreciation. 
     5 The accounting revelations of 2001-2003 in the U.S. were an additional indication of 
the potential biases that can enter reported profit data. 
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vagaries of allowed depreciation and amortization rates -- which can vary across firms 
depending on the types of assets in which they have invested -- and its post-tax profits can 
be further affected by corporate tax rates, which again can vary across firms depending on 
tax brackets and any special provisions in the tax code.  Also, the vagaries of the business 
cycle may have different effects on the profits of different types of firms, including different 
sizes. 
 Aggregate sales revenue of firms is often used as a way of measuring the absolute 
and relative sizes of enterprises.  This method was popularized by its use as the criteria for 
specifying Fortune magazine's "Fortune 500."  But the use of sales revenue presents obvious 
problems of double-counting.  For example, suppose a firm that both manufactures and 
distributes its products decides to spin off its distribution activities into a separate enterprise 
that buys only from its former affiliate.  Where there was previously a single manufacturer-
distributor that sold $X in goods per year (embodying $0.5X in value added), there are now 
two firms: a manufacturer that sells (say) $0.9X per year (with $0.4X in value added), and a 
distributor that buys the $0.9X and resells $X per year.  It is far from clear why these latter 
two firms should each be considered the approximate equal of each other and why the 
distributor should be considered the larger of the two.  Vertical mergers, of course, will 
reverse this process.  Thus, retail firms with relatively thin value-added margins would be 
over-represented by a sales-based measure; "upstream" firms with greater value-added 
relative to sales would be under-represented. 
 Further, the "sales revenue" concept is not well-defined for certain service 
industries.6  For example, should sales revenue include the securities sales of a brokerage 
firm on behalf of its customers?  Should the concept include the firm's securities sales from 
its own portfolio?  Both?  Neither?  In practice, neither category is reported as sales 
                                                           
    6 The accounting revelations of 2001-2003 have indicated that even "sales revenue" may 
be a more elastic concept than had been generally recognized. 
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revenue.  Instead, financial firms register as revenue their interest and fee income, plus any 
gains from their trading operations.  This revenue concept seems appropriate for 
comparisons with a non-financial firm.  But the employees of financial firms primarily think 
of the sizes of their companies in terms of assets -- which brings us to another candidate 
measure. 
 At first glance, a firm's assets appear to be a plausible method to use in measures of 
aggregate concentration. After all, assets, like employment, would be an indirect component 
of a firm's value added; when multiplied by the profit rate on those assets, the firm's profits -
- a direct component of value added -- would be obtained.  However, as a practical matter, 
using firms' assets as the basis for an aggregate concentration measurement presents at least 
three substantial problems.  First, if financial intermediaries, such as banks, insurance 
companies, and mutual funds are included, there is substantial double-counting, since the 
assets of these intermediaries largely consist of the liabilities of the enterprises to which 
they have lent or in which they have invested, with those liabilities in turn having been used 
to fund the assets of those enterprises. 
 Second, the presence (until 2001) of two alternative accounting treatments for 
mergers and acquisitions meant that substantially different levels of assets could appear on 
an acquiring company's balance sheet, solely because of the acquirer's choice of accounting 
treatment.  For example, in the "pooling" method of accounting, the assets of the acquired 
company are simply transferred to the acquiring company's balance sheet at their pre-merger 
balance-sheet values, which would mean relatively lower post-merger asset values. In the 
“purchase” accounting method, an additional goodwill asset is created and entered on the 
acquiring company's balance sheet, to reflect the difference between the purchase price and 
the pre-merger net asset (balance-sheet) value of the acquired company, which would mean 
relatively higher post-merger asset values.  Thus, reported asset values could vary 
substantially, depending on which accounting treatment was chosen in otherwise identical 
mergers. 
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 Third, changes over time in accounting and tax treatment of asset depreciation, 
amortization, and write-offs, as well as changes in the expensing-versus-writeoff treatment 
of various categories of costs, could arbitrarily affect reported asset values. 
 An asset-related measure would be the stock market value of a company's equity 
shares.  However, this measurement base would greatly restrict the "universe" for which 
aggregate concentration could be measured.  For the U.S., for example, only about 15,000 
companies are publicly listed; over 20 million enterprises would be excluded from this 
measurement base.  Also, stock market bubbles and crashes could well introduce extraneous 
noise into such calculations. 
 Two additional measurement issues should be mentioned:  First, no conventional 
measure will completely encompass the indirect influences of some large franchise-oriented 
companies (e.g., fast-food restaurant chains or hotel chains), since the structural 
characteristics of the independent franchisee owners will not be directly included in the 
company data of the franchiser "parent" (except through royalties and other fees).  Second, 
if the political-economy concern that surrounds aggregate concentration is that of corporate 
influence and control, then the increasing institutionalization of global stock markets may 
point instead toward a focus on the few hundred large mutual fund companies and pension 
fund managers that dominate institutional holdings. 
 Notwithstanding these last comments, value added is clearly the superior all-around 
measure of relative economic importance for making comparisons across firms and thus for 
serving as the basis for measurements of aggregate concentration.  Unfortunately, value 
added has a major practical drawback:  It is not regularly reported by companies in their 
public financial statements, nor is it regularly available (with only a few exceptions7) in 
government data that could be used for aggregate concentration ratios.  However, 
                                                           
    7 One such exception is value added for the largest companies in U.S. manufacturing 
sector; see White (2001, 2002). 
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governments and their political processes usually place a great deal of emphasis on 
employment: "jobs" and job creation and losses.  Accordingly, a focus on the employment 
share of large companies may well be an appropriate runner-up measure to value added.8  
We will use employment for the purposes of discussion below. 
 
B. What entities should be in the numerator? 
 The number of employees of the largest X companies should be included in the 
numerator of the global aggregate concentration measure.  But what constitutes a 
"company"?  Should government enterprises be counted as a company?  What about semi-
autonomous government enterprises?  Government enterprises that are publicly traded, with 
the public's holding a minority share stake?  Publicly traded enterprises where the 
government has a minority stake (but still exercises some control)?  Non-profit enterprises? 
 Further, what about the separately incorporated but wholly owned subsidiaries of other 
companies?  Partially owned subsidiaries?  Joint ventures?  Alliances? 
 There are no "right" answers to most of these questions.  Issues of control are at the 
heart of the political concern that underlies aggregate concentration and ought to be a 
guiding principle in any inclusionary selection principles.  But the researcher is often at the 
mercy of whoever has compiled the data and the list of companies.  Nevertheless, the 
inclusionary issues are surely worth keeping in mind. 
 
C. Who and what should be in the denominator? 
 If the employment of the largest X companies (somehow defined) is in the 
numerator, then employment should also be in the denominator.  But whose employment?  
                                                           
    8 Payroll, profits, and assets are also reported in White (1980, 2001, 2000).  As Hannah 
(1995) points out, concentration ratios for the same universe of enterprises are likely to be 
highest when assets are the base and lowest when employment is the base, because large 
firms tend to be capital-intensive. 
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And what categories?  Only the private sector?  Only non-agricultural (since none of the 
largest companies are farm-based)?  All countries in the global economy?  Or just the 
developed world (since the vast majority of the largest companies are headquartered there)? 
 Again, there are no "right" answers.  Where possible, an array of alternative 
denominators should be presented. 
 One additional "denominator" issue should be mentioned: comparability across 
countries when global measurements are being considered.  Reliance on international 
agency data (which usually involves efforts at standardization) should reduce (if not 
eliminate) this issue. 
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 IV. National Measurements 
 
 To this author's knowledge, there have been no previous efforts at measuring global 
aggregate concentration.  The only prior measurements of aggregate concentration have 
been at the national level.  And, except for White (1980, 2001, 2002), Golbe and White 
(1988), and Pryor (2001a), other attempts at measuring "aggregate" concentration have 
focused solely on manufacturing or the combined manufacturing and mining sectors (often 
described as "industrial" concentration).  An overview of these prior studies is provided 
here, to indicate the types of studies and findings that have been made. 
 White (2001, 2002) reports recent measurements of aggregate concentration for the 
U.S. economy.  He reports declining aggregate concentration for the U.S. economy from the 
1980s through the late 1990s, based on employment, payroll, and profit data, despite the 
merger waves of those decades. 
 For the manufacturing sector in six countries, Hannah (1995) provides estimates of 
lengthy time series of aggregate concentration.  He finds that aggregate concentration for 
manufacturing rose in all six countries from the late nineteenth century through the middle 
of the twentieth century, with divergent paths since then.  But, regardless of what one 
distills from this experience with respect to aggregate concentration in manufacturing, it is 
important to keep in mind that manufacturing is typically less than a third of private-sector 
GDP and employment, even in industrial countries (Hannah 1999).9 
 Finally, Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 63) provide a cross-section of "industrial" 
aggregate concentration levels for ten countries, as of 1985.  These data indicate that 
aggregate concentration tends to be inversely related to a nation's economic size. 
                                                           
    9 The manufacturing sector in the U.S. reached a peak of 33.1% of private-sector GDP in 
1955; by 1999 it had decreased to 20.5%. 
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 V. The Data 
 
A. The numerators. 
 As was argued above, value added is generally the best measure (numerator and 
denominator) for aggregate concentration calculations.  But, unfortunately, company 
compilations do not regularly calculate and report value added.  However, employment and 
profits -- which companies do report -- are fairly good runner-up measures, since the sum of 
wage costs (which is employment times average employee cost) plus profits approximates 
value added.  Also, employment itself is a major focus of political attention. 
   The availability of collections of company data involving employment and profits 
for the calculation of the numerators of any global aggregate concentration measures is quite 
limited.  There are only three candidate sources of data; and, as will be argued, among these 
three, only one source provides a usable time series. 
 1. The Financial Times.  The Financial Times (FT) publishes annually a list of the 
500 largest global companies.  The FT list is based on stock market value and extends back 
to the early 1990s.  In the past few years the FT list has also included company sales 
("turnover") data in addition to end-of-year stock market values.  But, as was argued above, 
neither stock market value nor company sales is a suitable measure for the calculation of 
aggregate concentration. 
 Consequently, the FT 500 series is not suitable for the calculations that are required 
for this report. 
 2. Fortune Magazine.  Beginning in 1995 (and covering 1994 and after), Fortune 
magazine has published annually a "500" list of the largest companies worldwide, as 
measured by sales.10  Fortune includes the employment and profits11 of those 500 
                                                           
    10 Prior to 1995, Fortune published global lists, but they were not integrated or 
comprehensive. 
    11 A methodological issue that was not raised in the discussion above concerns the 
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companies.  Fortune also has published separate "leading 50" lists, based separately on 
company employment and company profits (as well as on other company dimensions). 
 The Fortune global 500 and 50s lists do provide a suitable data base for use as the 
numerators in computing employment and profits aggregate concentration ratios for 2001, 
and they will be used later in this report.  Unfortunately, the Fortune lists cannot be used for 
comparisons over time.  This limitation arises because Fortune's criteria for inclusion in 
their lists have encompassed government-owned enterprises, such as the U.S. Postal System 
and national railway and postal/telephone systems in Europe and elsewhere.  Although this 
inclusion principle does not itself cause a problem,12 in the late 1990s Fortune began 
including large state-owned Chinese companies in the lists.  While only two Chinese 
companies were listed among the 500 for 1994, eleven were listed for 2001.13  These 
companies tended to be large employers, and thus their inclusion artificially boosted the 
employment totals for the global 500 and also for the global 50 largest employers.14  This 
artificial boosting thus renders the Fortune lists unsuitable for time series comparisons. 
                                                                                                                                                 
exchange rate at which the data for different companies or countries should be converted to 
a common currency.  Fortune uses the average exchange rate for the twelve months covered 
by a company's annual report to convert all of the profit figures to dollars (as does Forbes). 
    12 As was discussed above, these inclusionary criteria constitute a methodological issue to 
which there is no "right" answer. 
    13 These companies existed, at about their same size, prior to their inclusion in the 
Fortune lists.  Thus it was not the growth of these companies that triggered their inclusion; 
instead, the inclusions occurred as a consequence of Fortune's editorial judgment that these 
companies' reporting and disclosure standards had risen sufficiently to warrant their 
inclusion. 
    14 Seven Chinese companies were included in the Fortune list of the 50 largest employers 
for 2001; these seven ranked second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and twenty-first.  
By contrast, Fortune's list of the leading 50 companies ranked by profits was not affected by 
the inclusion of the Chinese companies, because those companies tended to be unprofitable. 
 The aggregate profits of the Fortune list of the 50 most profitable companies, for the years 
1994-2001, correlates almost perfectly (r = 0.99) with the Forbes profits data discussed and 
used below.  Only one Chinese company (ranked twenty-third) was in the list of 50 most 
profitable companies for 2001. 
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 3. Forbes Magazine.  Also beginning in 1995 (and covering 1994 and after), Forbes 
magazine has published annually a list of global "Super 50" companies, which Forbes ranks 
as the largest global companies, based on a composite calculation of sales, profits, 
employment, and market value.  Though Forbes does not provide the specifics of its 
composite formula, that formula does not appear to have changed appreciably over the 
period.  Also, Forbes includes only publicly traded companies, so the Chinese company 
inclusions that cause the Fortune lists to be unsuitable for time series comparisons are not 
present in the Forbes lists. 
 Accordingly, the aggregate employment and aggregate profits data from the Forbes 
global "Super 50" lists, from 1994 through 2001, will be used as the numerators for the 
global aggregate concentration measurements, for 2001 and for time series comparisons, 
that are presented later in this report. 
 
B. The denominators. 
  Since employment and profits constitute the numerators of the aggregate 
concentration calculations of this report, similar measurement bases are desirable for the 
denominator.  As will be seen, some compromises are necessary. 
 Since the aim of the calculations is global aggregate concentration measurements, 
the denominator ought to be based on similarly measured world economy data.  
Unfortunately, the most suitable world economy data -- drawn from the World Bank's 
"World Development Indicators" series15 -- can only provide approximations.  As the 
denominator for the employment calculation, only a series for the world aggregate labor 
force is available.16  As the denominator for the profits calculation, the World Bank data 
                                                           
    15 Other data sources, such as the United Nations and the International Labour 
Organization -- were searched for data that were comparable to the Fortune and Forbes 
employment and profits data and that also covered 1994-2001.  These sources did not yield 
suitable data. 
    16 There is no series on world employment, let alone world private sector employment. 
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yield two candidate series: world aggregate nominal GDP, and world aggregate nominal 
gross domestic saving (GDS).17 
 In addition to the world economy data, aggregate data for the countries that are 
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are 
also used as the denominator, because all of the Forbes "Super 50" companies are 
headquartered in OECD countries and the overwhelming majority of the Fortune 500 
companies are headquartered in OECD countries; accordingly, a comparison with the 
OECD aggregates should be informative.18  For the employment calculation, OECD 
aggregate employment is used.  For the profits calculation, OECD aggregate nominal GDP 
and aggregate nominal gross national saving (GNS) are candidates for the denominator.19 
                                                           
    17 There is no world profits series.  World aggregate GDP is a candidate, since it is a flow 
measurement representing general global economic activity; world aggregate GDS is a 
candidate because it is a flow and because profits should be an important component of 
saving.  In both cases, nominal data are used, because the Forbes profit data are in nominal 
terms. 
    18 Since almost all of the companies that are headquartered in the OECD have worldwide 
operations, the OECD aggregates are (in principle) too narrow and do not provide a 
sufficiently broad basis for an exact comparison.  Nevertheless, alongside a world economy 
calculation, the OECD aggregates provide an additional useful comparative perspective. 
    19 As was true for the world economy data, there is no OECD series on profits. 
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 VI. Global Aggregate Concentration Calculations 
 
 Table 1 provides the basic data that are used in this study.  In Panel A the first four 
columns provide the Fortune global employment and profits data for 2001 only; the next 
two data columns provide the employment and profits data from the Forbes global "Super 
50" series for 1994-2001.  As was discussed above, the Fortune and Forbes data provide the 
numerators for the aggregate concentration calculations.20   
 In Panel B the first three data columns provide the world labor force, nominal GDP, 
and nominal GDS data.  The final three columns provide the OECD employment, nominal 
GDP,21 and nominal GNS22 data.  These world and OECD data provide the denominators 
for the aggregate concentration calculations. 
 
A. Global aggregate concentration ratios in 2001. 
 Table 2 provides the calculation of the global aggregate concentration ratios for 
2001, using the employment and profits data for the Fortune global 500 and 50 largest 
companies and the Forbes global "Super 50" companies as the numerators and the 
                                                           
    20 Despite its name, the Forbes "Super 50" series lists 51 companies for 2001, because 
there were two companies that apparently yielded identical composite scores for the 50th 
place in the list.  To keep the series consistent with the 50 companies presented for the 
previous years, I averaged the employment and profit values for the two "50th" companies 
to compute the 50-company totals for 2001. 
    21 The OECD nominal GDP data are available only in index number form.  In order to 
provide a dollar flow series that is directly comparable to the Forbes profit data, I used the 
World Bank's aggregate GDP figure for "high income" countries for 2000 and then 
multiplied that value by the index numbers to achieve comparable dollar numbers for the 
other years in the series.  The individual numbers in this series should thus be seen as 
approximations, but their year-to-year relative values -- and thus their usefulness in 
providing year-to-year comparisons with the Forbes profit data -- remain intact.  The same 
caveat applies to the nominal gross national saving data. 
    22 See the previous footnote. 
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comparable world and OECD aggregates as the denominators.  As the table indicates, the 
Fortune 500 companies accounted for 1.60% of the world labor force in 2001, and 9.92% of 
OECD employment.  The Fortune list of the largest 50 employers employed 0.64% of the 
world labor force and 3.96% of OECD employment.23  And the Forbes "Super 50" 
companies employed 0.26% of the world labor force and 1.63% of OECD employment.24  
Similarly, the Fortune 500 companies' profits amounted to 0.94% of world GDP, etc. 
 Because there are no previous measurements of global aggregate concentration, 
there are no good bases for comparison.  There are no absolute standards or definitive ways 
of knowing whether these figures represent "high" or "low" numbers.25  However, any 
notion that large companies somehow "dominate" the world economy must surely be 
tempered by the revelation that the largest 500 companies accounted for only 1.60% of the 
world labor force in 2001, and their profits amounted to less than 1% of world GDP.26 
 The Forbes data permit a limited period of time series comparisons, allowing an 
over-time perspective.  It is to those time series comparisons that we now turn. 
 
B. The time series data. 
                                                           
    23 Recall, however, that seven companies in the Fortune employment 50 are Chinese 
companies that operate largely within China.  Those seven accounted for about 5.1 million 
of the 19.1 million employees in those 50 companies. 
    24 The Fortune 50 employment number is substantially above the Forbes "Super 50" 
employment number because the former represents the selection of the largest employers 
and includes the large Chinese companies, whereas the Forbes "Super 50" represent a 
composite ranking and includes only publicly traded companies. 
    25 It is worth noting, however, that these global concentration ranges are substantially 
below the recent national (U.S.) aggregate concentration measurements reported by White 
(2001, 2002). 
    26 Even if (somehow) agricultural production and government activities could be 
excluded from the denominators, so that the denominators were private-sector non-
agricultural employment and value added, it seems unlikely that the aggregate concentration 
ratios would rise appreciably in absolute terms. 
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 We now return to the data in Table 1 and explore its time series aspects.  As can be 
seen, the Forbes employment data move erratically and grow very slowly over the eight 
years of data; by comparison the profit data grow steadily and rapidly, but then fall 
substantially in 2001.  The world labor force data grow slowly but steadily, as does the 
OECD employment data; the world nominal GDP and GDS grow somewhat faster, and the 
OECD nominal GDP and GNS grow yet faster. 
 There are two convenient ways of providing somewhat more precision to the growth 
characterizations of these time series.  The first is to compare the value for the first year of a 
series with the value for the last year of that series and then calculate the average 
compounded annual rate of growth between the two years.  The results of these calculations 
are presented in the first data column of Table 3.  Using this method, we see that the Forbes 
employment data did not grow appreciably between 1994 and 2001, while the world labor 
force grew by 1.7% per year and OECD aggregate employment grew by 1.1% per year.27  
The Forbes profit data grew by 11.6% annually, while the world nominal GDP grew by 
3.0% and world nominal GDS grew by 2.8%; OECD nominal GDP grew by 6.2%, and 
OECD nominal GNS grew by 6.9%. 
 The second method for characterizing a time series is to convert the series to natural 
logarithms and calculate a regression of the logged time series against the calendar years.  
The resulting coefficient on the logged time series represents the overall average 
compounded annual rate of growth, which takes into account the data from all of the years 
and does not rely solely on the first and last years' data.28  The results of this method are 
presented in the second data column of Table 3.  As can be seen, this method yields an 
annual rate of increase for the Forbes employment data of 1.1%, while the world labor force 
data rose at an annual rate of 1.7% and the OECD employment data rose at a rate of 1.1%.  
                                                           
    27 All of the first-year/last-year calculations assume continuous compounding. 
    28 In essence, the regression fits a time trend line to the logged data points. 
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The Forbes profit data rose at a rate of 14.1%, while the world nominal GDP rose at a rate 
of 2.3% and world nominal GDS rose at a rate of 1.9%; OECD nominal GDP rose at a 
6.2% rate, and OECD nominal GNS rose at a 6.7% rate. 
 In sum, the Forbes employment data grew at an annual rate that was the same as or 
was below the comparable aggregates for the world and for the OECD, while the Forbes 
profit data grew at a rate that was substantially faster than the growth rates of the roughly 
comparable world and OECD aggregates.  We would expect these comparative rates of 
growth to translate into constant or falling aggregate concentration ratios for employment 
and rising ratios for profits.  That expectation is confirmed in the next section. 
 
C. Global aggregate concentration ratios, 1994-2001. 
 In Table 4 we present the global aggregate concentration ratios for 1994-2001, using 
the Forbes data in Table 1 as the numerators; these ratios are also graphed in Figures 1-3.  
As can be seen, the employment levels of the Forbes "Super 50" global companies 
accounted for a slightly decreasing share of the world labor force or of OECD employment 
over time.  By contrast, the profit levels on the Forbes "Super 50" global companies 
accounted for an increasing share of the roughly comparable aggregates for the world or the 
OECD over these same years. 
 Again, as was true for the constituent time series, we can characterize the movement 
over time of these ratios either through a first-year/last-year comparison or through a time 
series regression.29  These characterizations are presented in Table 5.  Using the first-
year/last-year comparisons, we see that the employment aggregate concentration ratio fell 
by 0.005 percentage points per year (with the world labor force as the denominator) or by 
0.02 percentage points (with OECD employment as the denominator); the profit aggregate 
                                                           
    29 Since the aggregate concentration ratio data are already in percentage form, the 
calculation of annual percentage point changes seems most straightforward.  Consequently, 
compounding and logarithms are not required. 
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concentration ratios rose by 0.05 percentage points per year (with world nominal GDP as 
the denominator), by 0.22 percentage points per year (with world nominal GDS as the 
denominator), by 0.04 percentage points (with OECD nominal GDP as the denominator), or 
by 0.18 percentage points (with OECD nominal GDS as the denominator). 
 If instead we use the time series regression coefficients (in the second data column 
of Table 5), the employment ratio fell by 0.002 percentage points per year (with the world 
labor force as the denominator) or by 0.001 percentage points per year (with OECD 
employment as the denominator); the profit ratio rose by 0.07 percentage points per year 
(with world nominal GDP as the denominator), by 0.32 percentage points (with world 
nominal GDS as the denominator), by 0.07 percentage points (using OECD nominal GDP 
as the denominator), or by 0.30 percentage points (using OECD nominal GDS as the 
denominator). 
 
D. Some reflections on these trends. 
 The data for the 1994-2001 period are clear:  If employment is the basis for the 
global aggregate concentration measurements, then the largest global companies accounted 
for a slightly declining share of the global aggregates.  If profit levels are the basis for the 
measurements, then the largest global companies accounted for a rising share. 
 The slightly declining share of large companies' employment levels is consistent 
with the trend for the U.S. found by White (2001, 2002).  Despite the merger wave of the 
1990s, very large companies have not experienced significant relative expansions of 
employment.  This outcome has been partly due to internal rationalizations and cost-cutting 
by these companies and partly due to significant numbers of spinoffs and divestitures of 
"pieces" of large companies.30 
                                                           
    30 As is pointed out in White (2001, 2002), about a third of the transactions that appear in 
the widely reported "merger and acquisitions" (M&A) annual lists are actually divestitures 
or spinoffs.
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 Similarly, the rising absolute levels of large company profits are consistent with the 
trend found for the U.S. by White (2001, 2002), although the upward trend seems to be 
sharper for the international group.  But economy-wide profits in the U.S. were also rising 
rapidly during the late 1990s, so the ratio for the U.S. was relatively constant during the late 
1990s.  Consequently, the pattern of rising profit ratios documented in this report is at least 
partly due to the absence of a profits measure for the denominators and the reliance instead 
on nominal GDP or domestic saving measures.  If aggregate global (or OECD) profits have 
been rising relative to nominal GDP or domestic saving, then using (the slower growing) 
GDP or domestic saving as the denominator for the profit-based global aggregate 
concentration measurements necessarily overstates the apparent rising trend of large 
company importance. 
 A second factor that should be considered with respect to profits is the likely over-
statement of large company profits that was revealed in during 2001-2003 to have been the 
case for a number of large companies in the U.S. in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Again, 
this would indicate a likely overstatement of the rising relative importance of large 
companies' profits. 
 Nevertheless, it seems quite possible that there was a net rising importance of large 
companies in the late 1990s, when measured by their profits.  However, this rising trend 
seems unlikely to be sustained, as is indicated by the sharp downturn displayed in 2001. 
 One other feature of the Forbes "Super 50" lists is worth noting: the nationalities of 
the headquarters of those companies.  Table 6 lists the number of companies that were 
headquartered in each country in 1994 and 2001.  As can be seen, the largest number of 
companies were headquartered in the U.S. in both years, and the number of U.S.-based 
companies increased between the two years, as did those headquartered in the Netherlands.  
The number of companies headquartered in Japan, Germany, and the U.K. fell; companies 
headquartered in France, Spain, Italy, and Bermuda entered the ranks; and the number of 
companies headquartered in Switzerland held constant. 
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 V. Conclusion 
 
 This essay has presented new and original measurements of global aggregate 
concentration for the years 1994-2001.  The data, albeit imperfect and sketchy, show that 
the largest global companies accounted for a slightly decreasing share of global 
employment, but a rising share of global profits.  The former trend is consistent with that 
found for the U.S. for the late 1990s.  The latter trend is different but is likely overstated and 
is unlikely to be sustained. 
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Table 1: The Data Used for the Calculation of Global Aggregate Concentration Ratios, 
1994-2001 
 
Panel A: Large Company Data (“the Numerators”) 
 
 
Fortune Global 500 
Largest Companies 
Fortune Global 50 





















1994 -a -a -a -a 7.8 $109 
1995 -a -a -a -a 7.2   112 
1996 -a -a -a -a 6.9   154 
1997 -a -a -a -a 7.3   182 
1998 -a -a -a -a 7.1   180 
1999 -a -a -a -a 7.6   218 
2000 -a -a -a -a 8.2   311 
2001 47.8 $306 19.1 $280  7.8b    245b 
 
Panel B: Global Aggregates (“the Denominators”) 











































1994 2,617 $26,458 $6,026 447 $16,843 $3,369 
1995 2,662   29,244   6,769 452   18,190   3,765 
1996 2,709   29,938   6,865 457   19,537   4,064 
1997 2,756   29,802   6,915 464   20,885   4,490 
1998 2,804   29,603   6,700 469   22,232   4,780 
1999 2,850   30,667   6,856 474   23,411   4,893 
2000 2,896   31,493   7,102 480   24,927   5,210 
2001 2,943    32,595d    7,350d 482   25,938    5,447d 
 
a See text for explanation 
b See text for details of calculation. 
c See text for details of calculation. 
d Estimated. 
 
Sources: Fortune; Forbes; World Bank; OECD. 
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Employment:    
World labor force as denominator    1.60%    0.64%    0.26% 
OECD employment as denominator 9.92 3.96 1.63 
Profits:    
World nominal GDP as denominator 0.94 0.86 0.75 
World nominal GDS as denominator 4.16 3.81 3.33 
OECD nominal GDP as denominator 1.18 1.08 0.94 
OECD nominal GNS as denominator 5.62 5.14 4.50 
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Logged Time Series 
Regression Coefficient 
Forbes employment        0.04%       1.1% 
Forbes profits 11.6 14.1 
World labor force   1.7   1.7 
World nominal GDP   3.0   2.3 
World nominal GDS   2.8   1.9 
OECD employment   1.1   1.1 
OECD nominal GDP   6.2   6.2 
OECD nominal GNS   6.9   6.7 
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Table 4: Global Aggregate Concentration Ratios, 1994-2001 
 
Panel A: Forbes Global “Super 50” Companies’ Employment 
 
Year 
World Labor Force as the 
Denominator 
OECD Employment as the 
Denominator 
1994    0.29%    1.75% 
1995 0.27 1.60 
1996 0.25 1.50 
1997 0.26 1.57 
1998 0.25 1.52 
1999 0.26 1.60 
2000 0.28 1.71 
2001 0.26 1.63 
 
 
Panel B: Forbes Global “Super 50” Companies’ Profits 
















1994    0.41%     1.81%    0.65%    3.24% 
1995 0.38 1.65 0.62 2.97 
1996 0.51 2.24 0.79 3.79 
1997 0.61 2.63 0.87 4.05 
1998 0.61 2.69 0.81 3.77 
1999 0.71 3.18 0.93 4.46 
2000 0.99 4.38 1.25 5.97 
2001 0.75 3.33 0.94 4.50 
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Time Series Regression 
Coefficient 
Forbes “Super 50” company 
employment/world labor force 
 
  -0.005 
 
-0.002 






Forbes “Super 50” company 
profits/world nominal GDP 
 
  0.05 
 
0.07 
Forbes “Super 50” company 
profits/world nominal GDS 
 
  0.22 
 
0.32 
Forbes “Super 50” company 
profits/OECD nominal GDP 
 
  0.04 
 
0.07 
Forbes “Super 50” 
company/OECD nominal GNS 
 





Table 6: Headquarters Countries for the Forbes “Super 50” Companies, 1994 and 2001 
 
Country Number of Companies 
 1994 2001 
   
United States 23 26 
Japan   8   2 
United Kingdom   7   6 
Germany   6   3 
Netherlands   3        4.5a 
Switzerland   3   3 
France -        2.5a 
Spain -   1 
Italy -   1 
Bermuda -   1 
 
a In 2001, the Forbes “Super 50” company list included 51 companies.  The two “50th” 
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Figure 2: Global Aggregate Concentration Ratios, as Measured by Large Company 
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Figure 3: Global Aggregate Concentration Ratios, as Measured by Large Company 
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